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The BAROMETER is a student newspaper for the exchange of ideas and 
information concerning the development and improvement of the 
professi ana 1. envi ronment at the Naval Postgraduate Schoo 1. 
****Ir***** 
"We have to do our own thinking; we have to make our own decisions ... 
Usually it takes 20% more work to get 1% more result .... You must 
act .... Many of the problems you'll meet are not completely soluble. 
All you can do is work toward solutions; live with your problems 
successfully; stay on top of them. II 
Ar1eigh A. Burke 
FEATURE: THE ARMED FORCES BUDGET 
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The MARCH 1973 edition of SEAPOWER magazine carried a detailed a p'p ~ai~ ot. this 
year's defense budget in a message to the U. S. Navy League written bY.l iJs President, 
Thomas E. Morris. In this BAROMETER feature he utilizes emotional his<toriCa1 citations 
and statistical dollar analysis to emphasize what he feels are seriou ~~ ~~oit~om~ngs ~f 
thisbudget and their effect on future national security. 6-< (..J-.) -l-.:; 
"Lowest Level of Capability in Years" filr 
At long last, the war in Vietnam which cost America so much is coming to an end. 
Yet, even before the sound of gunfire ceased, there were clear signs that Americans once 
again are turning inward, are desirous of disengaging themselves from the major role they 
have played on the world stage since World War II. 
This shouldn't come as a surprise; it has happened after every conflict in which we 
have been engaged during this century. It was even more likely to happen now because no 
other Free World nation gave of its resources - both human and material - in Vietnam as 
did the United States. And it certainly is perfectly natural, after having shouldered 
~ the burden of insuring our freedom and that of our allies for almost 30 years, to want 
others to share that burden. 
Weary though we may be of wars hot and cold, we still have a requirement of ourselves: 
to insure that this nation of ours is sufficiently strong to maintain its security. This 
is no more than plain horse sense, something of which we claim to have an abundance. 
Presumably we are sufficiently perceptive as a people to have learned during the 72-plus 
years of this century that it is unlikely any nation can maintain its physical integrity, 
its economic viability, or iGfreedom without that nation either coming under the 
protection of another or being strong enough to insure its own safety. Since it is 
obvious that no one nation or group of nations in the world today is going to insure the 
safety of the United States. it becomes equally obvious that we must preserve the 
strength to do so. 
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One might ask: "Against whom must we be strong? Whom do we fear?" Seemingly we 
are at a detente with the other two major powers in the world, China and the Soviet 
Union. We are talking with their representatives more now than we have in a quarter of 
a century. We are opening doors which until now have been slammed tightly shut. We 
are effecting trade agreements that can benefit the peoples of all three nations. And 
in the background there is that element which so many in the world believe will deter all 
further major confl ict, the "balance of terror" represented by the thermonuclear weapons 
which all three nations possess in varying degrees. 
Despite an international outlook which is, admittedly, rosier than it has been 
since World War II ended, we believe a quick look at what has taken place during that 
time will give us some concern for the future. Many of you recall our own claims that 
our possession of the nuclear bomb would insure peace for generations. But we still 
flew a Berlin airlift because of the Soviet blockade. We took a firm stand against the 
presence of Soviet troops in Iran and forced their withdrawal. We began the Marshall 
Plan initially to insure that Greece did not become a Communist satellite and then 
expanded it to get Europe back on its feet. We fought a war in Korea against one of the 
two major powers ment.ioned above - whose forces were supplied in part by the other. 
We watched with sorrow while Soviet armed forces crushed the Hungarian freedom 
fighters. We sent forces to the Middle East, to Lebanon and Jordan, to prevent their 
takeover by forces supplied by the Soviet Union. We took prompt action to stop the 
shelling of Quemoy and keep the island from falling to China. We forced the Soviets to 
withdraw nuclear missiles from Cuba, but still saw that island become a Soviet satellite. 
We entered the longest war in our history to halt aggression by forces attempting 
to conquer all of Vietnam - forces being aided and abetted by both the other major powers. 
And while we were expending vast quantities of our resources there - including thousands 
or our young men, the most precious resource of all - we saw history repeat itself when 
the Soviet Union crushed Czechoslovakia. 
Throughout these years, we have seen countless attempts to infiltrate and overthrow 
free-nat';on governments. We also have seen created, slowly but quite surely, the most 
modern, most powerful single-nation fighting force in the world today - one which is 
vastly capable on land, in the air. and on and under the sea. 
It is possible this force - created by the Soviet Union - may never be used against 
the United States. It is also possible that the awakening giant, China, may never see 
fit to use the sophisticated weapons she has learned to make and is now producing in 
volume, or the awe-inspiring array of manpower immediately available to her. But, in 
view of the historical record cited above. is it not prudent that. until there is positive 
assurance peace will prevail, we take whatever steps are necessary to insure the capa-
bility of maintaining our security? 
Doing this won't come cheaply. The President is asking for authority to obligate 
$85 billion for national defense needs during the fiscal year beginning July 1, and plans 
to actually spend $79 billion during that period. This reflects an increase of $4.1 
billion in new obligational authority over last year's budget. That will bring on a 
chorus of howls from those critcs of defense spending who believe that, now that the war 
in Vietnam is over, the budget for defense should plummet rather than increase. 
Unfortunately, there undoubtedly will be millions of Americans, who only read the 
headlines or hear the brief news summaries, who will conclude that Defense truly is taking 
the lion's share of the budget, to the detriment of spending for human needs. Too few 
will take the time to actually dete rmine the re lat ionship of spending for defense to the 
overall budget. or what has happened to this relationship in recent years. Nor will they 
take time to learn what can be purchased for $85 bill ion. and what is still on the 
shopping list. This is vJhct :"2 prODose to ~ J novl. 
For the third consecutive year. the Navy will re ceive the largest slice of the 
defense budget. reflecti ng a reali:atinn of the dire need to modernize the fleet. The 
Navy's share is $26.4 bi ll i -:-. . t he Air Force's S2Ll.6 . and the Army's $21.2. But 56 
percent of the expenditu res fo r each service will be for Deople; that doesn't leave too 
much for hardware. 
-
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The Navy's shipbuilding program calls for 14 new ships - the first of the new 
Trident missile-firing submarines, the fourth nuclear aircraft carrier, five nuclear 
attack submarines, and seven 00-963 destroyers. Eight more ships will be modernized, 
including the last five Polaris submarines to receive the longer range Poseidon missile. 
While preparing to build and convert 22 ships, the Navy will be putting another 80 
out of commission. Just six years ago, the fleet totaled almost 1,000 ships. At the 
end of this next fiscal year, there will be only 523. In view of the toll the last 
several months of the war in Vietnam took of the fleet. one wonders if this would be 
enough in the event there were an emergency which required the sustained use of naval 
forces. This year will be, hopefully, the low point of a long-range program that should 
see an increase in the size of the fleet in the years to come. But right now, the Navy 
is spread dangerously thin. 
Even though 56 per cent of the overall budget will be spent for people, the numbers 
of people in uniform will decline. The Navy will lose 7,000, the Marines 1.000, the 
Army and Air Force together 47,000. This continues a downward trend which has pared 1.3 
million men and women in uniform in the last six fiscal years and 274,000 civilians. In 
1968, Defense Department employees in and out of uniform represented 9.7 per cent of the 
total U.S. labor force; in FY 1974, they will represent 5.6 percent - a truly startling 
drop in so short a time. 
Ships and people aren't the only areas to be reduced markedly. The Navy aircraft 
inventory continues to drop, and the aircraft buy for this next year, 280, will be the 
lowest since World War II. Eight years ago the Navy brought four times that number. 
The average age of aircraft is climbing steadily; it is 7.7 years now and will be 12 years 
in 1980. The Navy must ask for $343 million for the purchase of spare parts just to 
keep its older aircraft flying. 
Overall, the Defense Department budget represents 28.4 per cent of the federal 
budget, the lowest percentage in 24 years. Six years ago it was 42.5 per cent. It will 
be 6.0 per cent of the gross national product; in 1968 it was 9.4 per cent. These ratios 
also have declined steadily over the past several years. The spending for human resources 
has long since surpassed those for defense requirements, and the gap between the outlays 
for each is widening steadily. 
The services collectively are embarking on a course of action which is heartening 
financially but disturbing from an operational point of view. Keenly aware that rising 
costs are making the purchase of some weapons systems almost prohibitive, they are 
planning a mix of sophisticated and simple systems. For example, new aircraft on the 
drawing boards will be nowhere near as complicated as the Navy's F-14 fighter, but 
neither will they have that aircraft's overall capability. New ships will be no match 
for the 00-963 in sophistication, nor will they be called upon to do as much. 
From a financial point of view, this is a great boon for the taxpayer. One wonders, 
though. how these less capable ships, aircraft, and weapons will fare against those of a 
potential aggressor whose construction programs are less inhibited by financial restraints. 
There are also some interesting omissions from the budget. The Navy's flexibility 
at sea depends upon its underway replenishment forces, 22 per cent of which are over 25 
years of age. Yet not a single ship with underway replenishment capability is included 
in his new ship-construction request. Further, of the new types of ships spoken of so 
glowingly by the Chief of Naval Operations - the sea control ship, the hydrofoil missile 
ship, and the patrol frigate - none is included in the current budget. There are funds 
only for advance procurement items and for research and development. Obviously the Navy 
has had some hard choices to make. The mere fact that none of the tried and true 
replenishment ships or those which were to revolutionize the Navy is included would 
indicate that this is much more of a modern-day "bare bones" budget than the sums being 
asked for suggest. 
Now, as perhaps the most vocal battle over a budget in years draws near, we should 
be remi nded that: 
Our strategic military capabilities are for the time being limited by the SALT 
agreements. However, our general-purpose capabilities have declined steadily for the 
past four years and still are going down. 
In contrast, the overall capabilities of the two other major world powers - the 
Soviet Union and China - are increasing steadily. Although the Soviets are limited 
strategically by SALT, they have continued to build a thorough and modern naval force and 
to maintain the high calibre of their other forces. 
Each year we are spending less of the overall federal budget on defense needs and less 
of the defense budget on hardware. 
The President obviously believes that this proposed budget is all the traffic will 
bear. It may well be. Even so, it leaves the Navy at its lowest level of capability 
in years and fails to take all of those steps toward modernization that even Congress 
has agreed must be taken. This frankly causes considerable misgivings. 
The President has the responsibility for recommending an annual budget which will 
insure the maintenance of those armed forces he considers adequate for the security of 
our country. His recommendations are based upon the best possible advice available to 
him or any other American. 
It is obvious that this year's budget, despite the amount of money being sought, 
is not a gold-plated one. There is no assurance that it even can do the job of insuring 
our security today and tomorrow. But if it will continue to permit more to be spent on 
human resources than ever before in history by any nation, then it warrants support. 
If you do indeed support the budget the President is recommending, let it be known 
that you do. But do your homework. Get to know the relationship between the defense 
budget and the overall plan for government expenditure, and be prepared to discuss it. 
Let it be known that this year's budget by no means fulfills our defense needs, but is 
indeed, in relative terms, austere. And above all, don't forget the track record of the 
two other major powers - what they have sought to do in the past 28 years and what in 
many cases we have prevented them from doing - and their increasing capabilities today. 
Remember, this is our security we are talking about. We can leave it in the hands of 
others to worry about, or we can do something about it ourselves. It's our choice. 
OTMS, OPERATIONAL TECHNICAL MANAGERIAL SYSTEM 
The Operational Technical Managerial System (OTMS) has been established by the 
Chief of Naval Personnel to provide officer professional development management in all 
areas of Navy endeavor. The system includes the subspecialty programs, with a primary 
goal of insuring that officers are properly coded in order to provide the correct assets 
to fill the subspecialty billets. Additionally, subspecialty community vertical 
(Lieutenant Commander through Captain) selection boards are conducted to identify top ~ 
performing officers as "Proven Subspecialists" based on their performance in a sub-
specialty area. 
On 26 October 1972, a board convened to select proven subspecialists in the 
Unrestricted Line Aeronautical Engineering discipline and to identify officers qualified 
for designation as Weapons System Acquisition Managers (WSAM). Of the 748 officers 
considered, 342 (47.5%) were selected. Officers so identified are notified by letter, a 
copy of which is inserted in the official records provided to future selection boards. 
Proven subspecialists may expect intensified assignment in their subspecialty area when 
on shore duty. 
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Of the 1,415 candidates considered for WSAM, 497 (35%) were chosen. Of those who 
applied for selection, 48% of the URL and 42% of the AEDO officers were selected. 
While the initial WSAM board considered only the aviation community, follow-on 
boards will complete WSAM identification for other appropriate disciplines such as naval 
engineering, ordnance engineering, physical sciences, and the financial and material 
management communities. 
A more definitive look at the subspecialty system may be found in OPNAVINST 1211.6D. 
Amplification on the WSAM selection, including an idealized career pattern, was provided 
in the February 1973 edition of BuPers' Officer Personnel Newsletter. 
As the number of operational ships and aircraft (hence, command billets) is 
drastically reduced each year, the WSAM program will increase in importance as a source 
for flag selection. It is imperative that each officer be adequately conversant in the 
subspecialty system and the potential effect it can have on career development. 
For those interested, a 35 minute videotape presenting an overview of the OTMS and 
WSAM programs, their purpose and their effect on the career officer, is available now 
through 18 May on channel 56 of the dial retrieval system in the Dudley Knox Library. 
EDITORIAL 
Slowly but surely, feedback concerning previous BAROMETER issues has filtered in to 
the Editorial Staff. These inputs have been anxiously awaited and it is hoped that they 
will continue. Let us hear from~! Next week's feature will be a discussion of the 
current controversy between "black shoe" and "brown shoe" Naval officers over two missile 
projects, Harpoon and Condor. 
